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In the second essay of Interpretation of Cultures — the essay entitled ‘The Impact of 
the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man’ — Clifford Geertz ([1965]1973: 44)* 
offers an early, beguiling account of his culture concept: 
 
Culture is best seen not as complexes of concrete behavior patterns — 
customs, usages, traditions, habit clusters — as has, by and large been 
the case up to now, but as a set of control mechanisms — plans, recipes, 
rules, instructions (what computer engineers call ‘programs’) — for the 
governing of behavior. 
 
This claim, that culture is analogous to computer programs, is curious given Geertz’s 
centrality to the ‘cultural turn’ (Bonnell and Hunt, 1999; Chaney, 2002; Cook et al, 
2012).  To contemporary readers, ‘control mechanisms’, ‘rules’ and ‘programs’ are 
more likely to signal authoritarian or highly prescriptive practices, rather than the 
open, interpretative and agential social interactions associated with Geertzian culture. 
 
‘The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man’, first published in 
1965, inhabits an interstitial moment within Geertz’s larger body of work.  It appears 
between his earliest ethnographic writings on Indonesia and his now famous 
exposition of ‘thick description’ as the hermeneutic method for unpacking culture as a 
public, social artifact.  In this largely overlooked essay, Geertz ([1965]1973: 44) 
claims that his theory of culture was predicated on a broader concept of man: ‘man’ he 
explains ‘is the animal most desperately dependent upon such extragenetic, outside-
the-skin control mechanisms, such cultural programs, for ordering his behavior’.  
According to him, a number of important mid-century developments ‘within 
anthropology, and in other sciences (cybernetics, information theory, neurology, 
molecular genetics)’ had furnished more precise definitions and greater empirical 
support for this view of man, as an incomplete animal desperately in search of rules, 
algorithms and instructions, and of culture, as a type of operational software or 
programming.1  What is more, the information networks that created and circulated 
culturally ‘significant symbols’ were not buried inside the minds of individuals, but 
circulated socially, in plain sight.  For Geertz ([1965] 1973: 45), this ‘ “control 
mechanism” view of culture’ is useful because ‘it begins with the assumption that 
human thought is basically both social and public — that its natural habitat is the 
house yard, the marketplace, and the town square’. 
 
How should contemporary audiences parse references to cybernetics and 
information theory in the middle of this account of culture?  How did cybernetics — 
the study of feedback-driven, self-regulating systems — inform Geertz’s notion of 
culture as constructed meaning?  Readers might recall Geertz’s ([1967] 1973: 351) 
tart criticism of Levi-Strauss’ La Pensee Sauvage, a text he ridiculed for its ‘exultant 
sciencism’, cobbled together from ‘structural linguistics, communications theory, 
cybernetics, and mathematical logic’.2  Was Geertz guilty of the same quasi-scientific 
embellishments?  These questions are further muddled by the location of The 
Interpretation of Cultures within Geertz’s career and more broadly within the 
trajectory of postwar American social thought.  Published in 1973, the collection 
emerges on the scene just as the cybernetics movement – an important driver of 
postwar American science and innovation – starts to wane, losing some of its broad 
appeal.3  Moreover, within Geertz’s career, The Interpretation of Cultures is widely 
seen as a turning point, the moment when interpretation — freed from the baggage of 
Parsonian systemic totalities, psychological determinism and Levi-Straussian 
structuralism — enters the scene of American cultural theory.  Or at least, this is how 
Geertz’s culture concept is received, not only in anthropology, but in other disciplines, 
where, by the late 1970s, the notion of interpretation appeared more broadly 
commensurate with renewed commitments to the centrality of the human agent and 
of social contingency — of meaning and context rather than structure and form (Hunt, 
1989; Ortner, 1999; Bonnell and Hunt, 1999).  The reference to cybernetics in the 
second essay of his famous volume appears strangely anomalous.   
 
Was the reference to cybernetics simply a voguish citation, leftover from an 
earlier time period?  The Interpretation of Cultures is, after all, a compilation of 
Geertz’s earlier pieces.  With the exception of the introductory essay, ‘Thick 
Description’, each of the chapters had been published before.4  The vast majority of 
the works were written in the 1960s, when cybernetics and information theory were 
still very popular, both in scholarly circles and in popular discourse.  A closer 
examination of the text and its history, however, dispels such easy dismissals.  In fact, 
information, as a central problem and mechanism for human understanding, animates 
much of Geertz’s writing from the late 1950s through to the 1973 publication of 
Interpretation of Cultures.  Seen in this context, the cybernetic references in the 
‘Impact’ essay form part of a long and well laid out agenda within his writing on 
culture.  As this essay will demonstrate, cybernetics and information theory were 
significant sources for Geertz’s account of human self-fashioning – a process by which 
humans ‘complete’ themselves through the creation of socially sourced cultural 
instructions.  This ‘informatic ontology’, as I label it here, depends upon feedback 
loops connecting social and biological processes.  Precipitated by the global political 
volatilities that Geertz and his colleagues witnessed in the 1960s, cybernetic theory 
helped him grapple with and significantly reformulate midcentury debates on human 
cultural diversity.  In the process, his new account of culture successfully shifted 
scholarly focus from the stability and self-regulation of social life, towards new 
interests in indeterminacy, historical contingency and the flexibility of recursive social 
processes. 
 
Rather than enclose the innovations of cybernetic thought within the seeming 
cul-de-sac of Cold War science, new scholarship has begun tracing its legacy and 
impact on contemporary knowledge practices.  By the end of the 20th century, 
cybernetics had been largely dismissed by scholars as a neo-mechanistic 
computational practice, tied to the aspirations of American defense interests and the 
conceptual reductions of war games, rational choice theory and missile guidance 
science (Galison, 1994; Johnston, 2009).  However, a wide range of new research has 
started to reconsider the historical context of late Cold War cybernetic science and its 
influence on later innovations in linguistics, computational science, warfare, 
psychology, architecture, art, social theory and business management (Geoghegan, 
2011; Halpern, 2014; Kline, 2015; Liu, 2010; Martin, 2005; Mirowski, 2003; Pickering 
2010).  Using cybernetics as a starting point allows contemporary scholars to write 
new historical genealogies of our present techno-scientific investments.  As the bitter 
and acrimonious battles of the science/culture wars begin to recede, contemporary 
social science must struggle with new theoretical horizons, which position culture and 
nature not as opposing forces, but as parts of a single matrix – making visible new, 
post-human ontologies of the subject (Braidotti, 2013; Descola, 2005, Hayles, 2008; 
Wolfe, 2003).  Less persuaded by the sureties of earlier social theory, scholars are 
increasingly encouraged to pay attention to the contingent, emergent and 
indeterminate properties of social phenomena (Collier and Ong, 2005; Roitman, 2014; 
Tsing, 2004).  These concerns, driven by the impact of automation, the harsh realities 
of post-work economies and the growing reach of digital communications and 
networks, have renewed scholarly interests in cybernetics, network societies and the 
history of modern information infrastructures.  In revisiting Geertz’s notion of culture, 
we follow one nodal point towards this present, and in the process can better 
understand how the legacies of postwar cybernetics continue (albeit transformed) to 
shape our understanding of humans as subjects embedded in complex information 
systems.   
 
Such work also provides an important conceptual bridge, re-connecting recent 
scholarly interest in anthropological ontologies with their midcentury precursors.  In 
his review of anthropology’s recent ‘ontological turn’, John Kelly draws on the 
writings of Phillipe Descola to explore a three-fold distinction between ethnography, 
ethnology and anthropology.  For Descola, ethnography serves as the lowest 
(primary) level of anthropological research, constituted by the immediacy of the 
ethnographic encounter.  Ethnology, situated at one level of conceptual distance from 
ethnography, provides tools for comparative work across different subjects and 
contexts.  The third and final level of scholarship,  ‘anthropology’ proper, is a 
philosophical field that explains ‘more generally how particular beings, humans, 
operate, detect, and transform their environments, with remarkable but not infinite 
diversity, and thus how worlds are composed’ (Kelly, 2014: 261).  According to 
Descola, ‘[t]here are few people – Levi-Strauss is one of them – who do anthropology 
in [this] sense’ (Descola, 2014: 9).  Descola contrasts philosophical anthropology with 
Geertzian ‘thick description’, which, he argues, engages in the production of dense 
cultural prose in the service of ethnography, but does not tackle the larger question of 
how humans produce ontological relationships.   
 
Though Descola reassures readers that ontology never completely disappeared 
from anthropological concerns, the discipline’s recent ‘ontological turn’ presumes a 
significant scholarly shift in the last decades of the 20th century towards epistemology 
as the only available terrain for explaining social differences.  Yet, the essay, ‘The 
Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man’, with its midcentury 
references to cybernetics, information theory and molecular biology, demonstrates a 
different historical trajectory for our modern culture concept.  As historian and 
cultural theorist William Sewell explains, Geertz built his theory of culture on an 
‘impressive ontological foundation’ (1999; 46), in which biology, human self-
fashioning and cultural symbols are mutually dependent and connected by recursive, 
feedback driven processes of development and adaptation.  This ‘informatic ontology’ 
does not always provide the detailed, rich account of world-making found in current 
writings associated with the ‘ontological turn’, but there are nevertheless important 
overlaps. Both accounts deliberately connect natural and cultural worlds within a 
single sphere of analysis, and shift theoretical emphasis away from merely mental 
‘understandings’ towards tracing densely mediated, emergent forms of human and 
social organisation.  Ontological notions, rather than disappearing from anthropology 
in the late twentieth century, have been lurking at the back of anthropological 
hermeneutics for a long time.   
 
A deep historical investigation of Geertz’s culture concept also provides new 
traction  on questions and problems that have long plagued the reception of his 
hermeneutic method.  Despite its immense popularity, which stretched far beyond the 
field of anthropology, scholarly assessments of Geertzian culture frequently raise as 
many questions as they answer.  Many of the significant critiques of Geertz point out 
that his theory of interpretation elides questions of power.  Whose cultural 
interpretations are authorized and whose are rendered mute or ineffective (Asad, 
1983; Marcus and Clifford, 1986; Rosaldo, 1989; Bonnell and Hunt 1999; and Ortner 
1999)?  Was Geertz’s notion revolutionary or reactionary?  Was he an essentialist or a 
social constructivist?  Is culture something humans do, or something they are 
(Wedeen, 2002)?  Is this idea of culture attentive to human difference in a way that 
eschews racism, or does it fall back on racialized stereotypes (Trouillot, 2003)?5  
Given Geertz’s extraordinary impact, not only on anthropology but a wide range of 
related fields in the social sciences and humanities, how do we begin to understand 
and disentangle his theory from its broader reception?  Which conceptual questions 
or thorny problems did this concept ‘solve’, such that it brought so much newness to 
history, literature and politics (Scott, 1992; Scott, 2002)?  Sorting through these 
dilemmas requires a close re-examination and an excavation of the intellectual milieu 
in which it was produced — one that goes beyond the euphoria of rupture 
surrounding the cultural turn.  
 
Re-examining the ‘Impact of the Concept of Culture’ essay, paying particular 
attention to its reliance on notions of cybernetic feedback and control, untangles some 
of the central questions that have long plagued the reception of Geertz’s culture 
concept.  It allows contemporary critics to better situate the concept within the 
turbulent politics of the 1960s, framing that moment more clearly and with greater 
distinction from the ‘cultural turn’ of the 1970s and the 1980s.  Uncovering such 
conceptual genealogies helps reconnect Cold War anxieties to the theoretical concerns 
that animate current anxieties about global information societies.  In his book Machine 
Dreams, the economist and economic historian Philip Mirowski argues that 
cybernetics and its many related fields (such as computer science, informatics, 
rational choice theory, operations research and game theory) served as a backbone of 
American social science in the post-War period.  Mirowski (2002: 6-7) describes how 
the computer, as metaphor and instrument, remakes the field of economics around 
the powerful idea of quantifiable ‘information’, and suggests that this provides a 
broader template for thinking about many related postwar spheres of knowledge 
production.  When Geertz says that culture serves as a control mechanism for human 
action (just as programs guide computers), we get a sense of just how deeply this 
structure of thought ran. 
 
A Cybernetic Geertz: Culture as Information 
 
‘The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man’ was first 
delivered as a lecture at the University of Chicago on May 10, 1965 (University of 
Chicago Press Office, n.d.).  It was commissioned as part of a series of public talks, 
titled the ‘Monday Lectures,’ that were presented before a live audience and also 
broadcast on radio.  Spearheaded by the biophysicist John R. Platt, the series gathered 
scholars across various disciplines: 
The idea was to attempt once more, in the light of new scientific and 
philosophical and humanistic ideas, to answer the eternal questions, 
‘Where do we come from? Who are we?  Where are we going?’ (Platt, 
1965: 3). 
 
The organisers believed that robust dialogues across the humanities and natural 
sciences had become increasingly urgent in the context of expanding American power 
and technological might.  Platt, in his editorial introduction to the collected lectures, 
writes, ‘Today we are in the midst of a transitional crisis as we move with halting 
steps through a time of great danger, unsteadily but surely in the direction of a high-
technology world society’  (Platt, 1965: 4).  The terms ‘crisis’ and ‘danger’ had 
multiple possible referents.  The Monday Lectures were first published in the Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists.  From its inception in 1945, the BAS was concerned with the 
power and enormous peril posed by nuclear energy and the atomic bomb.  The 
magazine is best known for creating the Doomsday Clock in 1947 to highlight the 
imminent threat and devastating consequences of nuclear warfare.6  At the same time, 
the ‘crisis’ of the American academy referred to a growing unease, which undermined 
many of the conceptual totalities operative within discrete fields of knowledge 
between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s.  Partly connected to wider political unrest 
and tied to the emerging civil rights and campus student movements, this rising 
turbulence would many unsettle established disciplinary and social boundaries in the 
years to come.7 
 
The Monday Lectures were held at the University of Chicago during the winter 
and spring quarters of 1965.8  The entire series was published twice between 1965-
1966 — first, in serialized and abridged articles in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 
and later, in the collected volume New Views on the Nature of Man.  Between the 
spring of 1965 and its eventual appearance in The Interpretation of Cultures, ‘The 
Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man’ appeared in publication at 
least six times.  Geertz was a prolific re-publisher.  In addition to its publication in the 
BAS and the collected volume of Monday Lectures, the essay also appeared in the 
journal Social Education, in a psychiatry magazine titled Reflections and in two more 
edited volumes – Yehudi Cohen’s Man in Adaptation and Eugene Hammel’s Man 
Makes Sense (Geertz, n.d.b).  Prior to the publication of the Interpretation of Cultures, 
it stood out for nearly a decade as Geertz’s singular statement on the culture concept. 
 
In his 1965 Monday Lecture, Geertz explains that understanding man — his 
nature, potential and limitations — is a necessary precursor to understanding the 
concept of culture.  He contrasts two opposing views of man and his relationship to 
culture.  The first (which Geertz calls the stratigraphic view) is based on Talcott 
Parsons’s action system theory, and sees culture as just one particular layer of 
structuring determinants (alongside biology, psychology and society) that together 
explain the complexity of human action (Geertz, [1965] 1973: 37). He explains: 
In this conception, man is a composite of ‘levels,’ each superimposed 
upon those beneath it and underpinning those above it.  As one analyzes 
man, one peels off layer after layer, each such layer being complete and 
irreducible in itself, revealing another, quite different sort of layer 
underneath (Geertz, 1973: 37). 
 
Parson’s action theory recognized culture as a crucial aspect of human life.  However, 
it turns the study of culture into a search for universals, much as the disciplines of 
biology, psychology, and sociology sought commonalities across human experience, 
irrespective of history, location or other specificities.  This stratigraphic view 
encouraged a search for ‘empirical uniformities that, in the face of the diversity of 
customs around the world and over time, could be found everywhere in about the 
same form’ (Geertz, [1965] 1973: 38).  
 
 The quest for such ‘bloodless universals’, explained Geertz, failed to grasp or 
appreciate the importance of human diversity.  Moreover, the relationship between 
cultural factors and non-cultural factors remained obscure.  He worried that once 
‘culture, psyche, society, and organism have been converted into separate scientific 
“levels,” complete and autonomous in themselves, it is very hard to bring them back 
together again’ (Geertz, [1965]1973: 41).  In his undergraduate lecture notes from 
this same period, Geertz complained that Parsons’s complex taxonomies veiled the 
relationship between different levels of social phenomena.  He (n.d.a, emphasis 
added) explained that personality, society and culture each “have […] varying patterns 
of integration, [so that] what are values at the cultural level are needs at the 
personality level and role expectations at the social’.  Parsonian social theory, 
however, quite often failed to clearly explicate the connections between cultural 
(symbolic) values and psychological needs or social obligations.  Such frustrations 
lead him to propose a more streamlined account of human action.  Geertz wanted a 
model that was capable of integrating social, psychological and biological factors into 
a singular, ontological account of man, while still being able to account for the wide-
ranging, constitutive nature of human cultural variation.  
 
 It is in this context that Geertz proposes a different culture concept, one that 
sees culture as a set of ‘control mechanisms — plans, recipes, rules, instructions (what 
computer engineers call ‘programs’) for the governing of behavior’.  His view of 
culture rests on his view of man as being ‘precisely the animal most desperately 
dependent upon such extragenetic, outside-the-skin control mechanisms, such 
cultural programming, for ordering his behavior’ (Geertz, [1965] 1973: 44).  This new 
theory, rather than stressing underlying social and biological commonalities, was 
concerned with how humans negotiated variation and indeterminacy.  According to 
Geertz ([1965] 1973: 44), ‘we all begin with the natural equipment to live a thousand 
kinds of life but end in the end having lived only one’.  What explains the choices and 
actions that come to define the lives people actually lead?  Here lay culture’s real 
explanatory potential.   Lower animals can rely almost entirely on their biological 
programming to guide their actions, but human biology is sorely ‘incomplete’ (Geertz, 
[1965] 1973: 47).   
 
Geertz outlines a slow evolutionary process by which crucial human activities 
(hunting and gathering, tool making, the creation of social structure) arose alongside 
symbolic structures (language, art, myth, ritual).  Geertz explains that ‘[b]etween the 
cultural pattern, the body and the brain, a positive feedback system was created in 
which each shaped the progress of the other’.  Biology and culture were mutually 
dependent forces; understanding their interplay accounted for the emergence of 
complex human behavior and its wide-ranging potential: 
 
By submitting himself to governance by symbolically mediated programs for 
producing artifacts, organizing social life, or expressing emotions, man 
determined, if unwittingly, the culminating stages of his own biological destiny.  
Quite literally, he created himself (Geertz, [1965] 1973: 48). 
 
In turning to cybernetics, Geertz gives his readers an informatic ontology, one in 
which cultural symbols supplement biological programming by giving specific shape 
and form to the very indeterminate, vague possibilities into which humans are born.  
‘We are, in sum,’ explained Geertz, ‘incomplete or unfinished animals who complete or 
finish ourselves through culture — and not through culture in general but through 
highly particular forms of it’ (Geertz, [1965] 1973: 49).  While all humans are 
biologically equipped to speak, we are only equipped by our culture to speak English.  
 
The specificity of cultural production was not mere embellishment or 
elaboration, but a human necessity.  At a very fundamental level, we would simply 
cease to function without these vitally important cultural codes.  Humans ‘without 
culture would not be the clever savages of Golding’s Lord of the Flies thrown back 
upon the cruel wisdom of their animal instincts’, he argues.  Rather they would be 
‘unworkable monstrosities’ (Geertz, [1965] 1973: 49).   This central lesson — that 
culture provides vital, socially-constructed programming and instructions, without 
which humans would be dysfunctional — was largely forgotten, after the publication 
of Interpretation of Cultures, whose reception centered around the agency of 
interpretation, rather than the underlying ontogenetic co-constitution of man and 
culture.  Interpretation, and Geertz’s hermeneutic approach, offered readers greater 
scope for exploring social choice and agency — setting human action free from the 
staid determinations of social structure and biological necessity.  In the process, we 
forgot that cultural interpretation was itself a necessary component of human life.  
Without it, we would be as ‘unworkable’ as a computer without a program. 
 
While references to cybernetics recede from Geertz’s writings after the 
publication of the Interpretation of Cultures, the underlying ontologies never 
disappear from Geertz’s account of culture.  In his essay, ‘Culture, Mind, Brain/Brain, 
Mind, Culture,’ published in 2000 in the collection Available Light, he writes: 
 
[The] co-evolution of body and culture, the functionally incomplete 
character of the human nervous system, the ingredience of meaning in 
thought and of thought in practice—suggests that the way toward an 
improved understanding of the biological, the psychological, and the 
sociocultural is not through arranging them into some sort of chain-of-
being hierarchy.  
 
Here, Geertz revisits his old objections to Parsons’s ‘stratigraphic’ model.    The path 
forward, he explains, had already been suggested by other fields, where we have 
become ‘used to dealing with distributive, partially connected, self-organizing 
systems, especially in engineering and biology, and in computer simulations of 
everything from ant hills and neuron assemblies to embryonic development and 
object perception’ (Geertz, 2000: 206-7).9   This is merely an update of the concepts 
and language found in this original 1965 lecture.  ‘Self-organizing systems’ and 
‘parallel distributed processing’ represent areas where the lasting legacies of mid-
century cybernetics continue to impact contemporary conceptual landscapes and sites 
of technical practice.  In this late essay, Geertz laments the disciplinary distance 
between psychology and cultural anthropology, and reminds readers that analyzing 
the partial, constitutive connections between biology, psychology and sociology 
provides the key to understanding humans, as a species, and their on-going 
development.  He writes (2000, 205), ‘ Our brains are not in a vat, but in our bodies.  
Our minds are not in our bodies, but in the world.  And as far as the world, it is not in 
our brains, our bodies, or our minds: they are, along with gods, verbs, rocks, and 
politics, in it’.    These claims attest to the ontological nature of Geertz’s theory, in 
which his famous hermeneutic method of ‘thick description’ sits atop an account of 
how humans materially create themselves, their societies and the world around them, 
through on-going informatic processes that connect brains, minds and socially-
embedded symbols. They also evidence Geertz’s faith in the open-ended processes of 
self-fashioning that characterised his more discontinuous model of social systems, in 
contrast to an older, Parsonian emphasis on social stability and order. 
 
 




The key to understanding Geertz’s ontological formulation lies in his use of the 
term ‘information’, which consistently animates his writings from the 1960s.  It is a 
term that Geertz borrows from Parsonian systems theory, but one he re-appropriates 
to launch a new account of culture – as recursive, emergent and highly contingent.  
Witnessing growing political unrest on US campuses as well as rising ethnic tensions 
in the ‘new nations’ of the formerly colonized world, Geertz turns to information 
theory to better understand social discontinuity and instability within social forms.  
The ‘Impact’ essay presents the most developed account of culture as ‘programming’, 
but it was not an isolated statement.  Similar arguments (of culture as a set of codes, 
rules, recipes and programs), grounded in postwar techniques for mathematically 
analysing information, can be found throughout Geertz’s essays of this period.  In his 
college lecture notes from this period, Geertz writes:  
 
Culture […] is to be understood not as a mere instrument for practical 
ends […], nor as a mere reflection of social arrangements […] , nor yet as 
a mere means of knowing, in the purely cognitive sense […], but rather 
culture is to be considered as a set of, to introduce a new term, 
information sources in terms of which men order their behaviour 
(Geertz, n.d.a, emphasis added). 
 
In ‘Impact’, he summarizes the human condition by arguing that we ‘live in an 
‘information gap’ (Geertz, [1965] 1973, 50).  Since our biological programming is 
insufficient for navigating a complex and unfamiliar world, we must learn and 
manipulate socially meaningful symbols to create instructions that supplement our 
genetic heritage.  We depend on what Geertz, in various essays from this period, 
describes as ‘extragenetic information’.  Lesser animals largely rely on instinctual 
response mechanisms coded into their genetic make-up, but we humans, with our 
expansive intellects, agency and varying capacities, biologically evolved hand in hand 
with our ability to forge, follow and transform cultural imperatives and logics.   
 
Geertz fleshes out this theory in his 1966 essay, ‘Religion as a Cultural System’.  
He explains that, unlike genetically coded instructions, extragenetic information is 
located ‘outside the boundaries of the individual organism’, residing instead in the 
social, ‘intersubjective world of common understandings into which all human 
individuals are born’.  Cultures should be understood as ‘sources of information’ (like 
genes), because ‘they provide a blueprint or template’ for guiding human action 
(Geertz, [1966b] 1973, 92).  This language is nearly identical to the earlier ‘Impact’ 
essay, but here Geertz goes further, explaining that, just ‘[a]s the order of bases in the 
strand of DNA forms a coded program, a set of instructions, or a recipe, [….] so culture 
patterns provide such programs for the […] social and psychological processes which 
shape public behavior’ (Geertz, [1966b] 1973, 92).  Geertz is keen to explain that the 
comparison between genes and cultural symbols is ‘more than a strained analogy’.  
Between the two, there is 
 
actually a substantial relationship, for it is precisely because of the 
fact that genetically programmed processes are so highly 
generalized in men, compared with lower animals, that culturally 
programmed ones are so important; only because human 
behaviour is so loosely determined by intrinsic sources of 
information that extrinsic ones are so important’ (Geertz, [1966b] 
1973, 92-93). 
 
Geertz’s writings of this period rearticulate the Herderian view of man as an 
‘incomplete’ animal within the emerging conceptual terrain of genetics, molecular 
biology and information studies, to argue that human genes are supplemented by 
symbolic codes and instructions.  In ‘Ideology as a Cultural System’, Geertz ([1964] 
1973, 217-8) reiterates that man is a ‘self-completing animal’.  An ‘agent of his own 
realization, he creates out of his general capacity for the construction of symbolic 
models the specific capabilities that define him’.  People must fill the ‘information gap’ 
they are born into by creating roadmaps, poems and other cultural forms that 
transform uncertainty into highly specified possibilities and actions.   
 
Geertz developed some of these ideas in an earlier essay, entitled ‘The Growth 
of Culture and the Evolution of the Mind’ (1962).  Based on the writings of Sherwood 
L. Washburn and William W. Howells, Geertz ([1962] 1973, 67-8) explains that the 
human brain, with its enormous processing capacity, developed alongside the ability 
to create symbols and forge durable social structures (see also Sewell, 1997, 43-4).  
He explains to readers that during the Pleistocene, human neural development 
expanded significantly, aided by a rapidly changing cultural setting: 
 
The Ice Age appears not to have been merely a time of receding 
brow ridges and shrinking jaws, but a time in which were forged 
nearly all the characteristics of man’s existence which are more 
graphically human, his thoroughly encephelated nervous system, 
his incest-taboo-based social structure, and his capacity to create 
and use symbols. 
 
This, argued Geertz, was not merely a question of historical ordering (whether neural 
development preceded culture or not), but suggested a relationship of mutual 
dependence. Humans, with their impressively large brains, would have been utterly 
dysfunctional without culture (an idea that he reiterates in the ‘Impact’ essay): 
 
Rather than culture acting only to supplement, develop, and 
extend organically based capacities logically and genetically prior 
to it, it would seem to be ingredient to these capacities 
themselves.  A cultureless human being would probably turn out 
to be not an intrinsically talented but unfulfilled ape, but a wholly 
mindless and consequently unworkable monstrosity (Geertz, 
[1962] 1973, 68). 
 
Cultural ‘information’, seen in this context, is not immaterial or ‘idealist’, as some 
critics of Geertz have claimed (see Roseberry, 1989).  Rather, it is as necessary for 
human functioning as breathing.  William Sewell, summarizing Geertz, explains that 
‘semiotic systems are not unworldly or ghostly or imaginary; they are as integral to 
the life of our species as respiration, digestion, or reproduction’ ([1962] 1999, 45). 
 
Geertz’s ‘Growth of Culture’ essay bridges developments in the postwar 
behavioural sciences (including psychology and sociology) with scholarship in the 
philosophy of mind.  By the 1960s, the behavioural sciences were suffused with 
concepts and vocabulary borrowed from cybernetics and information theory.  Irwin 
Pollack’s 1968 entry for ‘Information Theory’ in the International Encyclopedia of the 
Social Sciences demonstrates the extent of this borrowing: 
 
The very verbal descriptive fabric of the behavioural sciences has become 
thoroughly interlaced with informational concepts: individuals or groups 
are described as ‘information sources’ or ‘receivers’; skilled performance 
is described as ‘information processing’; memory is described as 
‘information storage’; nerves are described as ‘communication channels’; 
the patterning of neural impulses is described as ‘information coding’; the 
brain is described as ‘an information complex,’ etc. (Qtd in Kline, 2017, 
10) 
 
The widespread usage of ‘information’ throughout the human and computational 
sciences speaks to a broader set of historical transformations, signaling an emerging 
global ‘information era’ during the later half of the 20th century (Castells, 1996; 
Castells, 1997; Castells, 1998; Kline, 2015; Gleick, 2011).  Starting in the immediate 
postwar period, innovative work in engineering, applied mathematics and 
communications began to frame ‘information’ as a crucial feature of all dynamic 
processes – central to feedback, regulation and learning, in both biological and 
artificial systems.  These ideas formed the core principles of cybernetics, a postwar 
‘interdiscipline’ popularized by the 1948 publication of Norbert Wiener’s Cybernetics 
– Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (Wiener, [1948] 
1961; Galison, 1998).  Wiener and his colleagues began their cross-disciplinary study 
of feedback loops in the 1930s, but found greater impetus for their work after the war, 
when new, general-purpose electronic computers became widely available for 
research.   
 
This work also coincided with the formal development of information theory, 
pioneered by Wiener and Claude Shannon.10  Shannon’s mathematical analysis of data 
transmission (as the relationship between signals and noise) inspired scientists in 
numerous fields, including sociology, molecular biology, applied mathematics and 
robotics, in their investigations of the informatic exchanges that drive metabolism, 
growth and development (see Ashby, 1960; Wiener et al, 1943; Wiener, 1948; 
Shannon and Weaver, [1949] 1964).  Citing recent work by Lily Kay (2000) and 
Evelyn Fox Keller (1995), Ronald Kline (2015, 94) explains that ‘life scientists, 
especially molecular and developmental biologists, readily embraced cybernetics in 
the 1950s because of its promise to mathematically model living organisms and break 
the genetic code’.  When Geertz frames culture as rules, recipes and codes for 
behaviour – and references innovations in cybernetics, information theory and 
molecular genetics – readers begin to appreciate the range and significance of these 
vast, but rapidly converging conversations.  ‘Information’ was a vital part of advanced 
biological systems, and brains and their ‘programs’ formed inseparable wholes. 
 
This period also witnessed important new breakthroughs in the development 
of transistors, microchips, semiconductors and fibre optic cables (Braun and 
McDonald, 1982; Gertner, 2012; Hecht, 1999).  During the early decades of the 
postwar period, ‘information’ as an object of analysis and scholarly work underwent 
significant change.  By the end of the 20th century, the term ‘information’ did not 
merely signify immaterial thoughts, ideas and facts – as it had a century prior.  It now 
referenced a new, highly modern material artifact that took up space (in bits and 
bytes), was protected by data and privacy laws and required increasingly significant 
amounts of global energy to create, store and reproduce – even as it became 
economically cheaper to process and transmit. 
 
Geertz repeats this central claim, that genes and symbols are mutually 
dependent sources of ‘information’, across a wide range of essays in the 1960s, but he 
was not the first to make this argument.  He borrows this formulation, of culture as a 
source of ‘information’, from Parsons, who was deeply interested in the operational 
similarities between cultural symbols and genetic codes.  Following the work of the 
insect biologist, Alfred Emerson, who argued for ‘a functional equivalence’ between 
‘the gene’ and the ‘the symbol’, Parsons stressed that ‘the genetic constitution of the 
species’ and ‘the cultural heritage of social systems’ were not two opposing and 
incommensurate sources of human behavior, but rather that biology and culture 
should be seen as distinct but interpenetrating levels, or sub-systems (Parsons, 1970: 
850).  The innovations of cybernetics and information compounded these claims, by 
flattening the difference between biology and culture into commensurate sources of 
‘information’.  For Parsons, the fact that genes and symbols both carried decodable 
instructions helped explain how such equivalences operated in different, but 
connected domains, of human activity.  
 
Given Parsons’s deep theoretical commitment to the functional similarities of 
genes and symbols – a notion that he derived partly from midcentury cybernetics – it 
is curious that Geertz would also lean so heavily on cybernetics and information 
theory when framing his concept of culture.  At first glance, it appears a strange choice 
for constructing an account of man (and his culture) that stood in opposition to 
Parson’s stratigraphic model.  In order to understand and appreciate the contrast 
between these different theories of human activity, it is important to recognise that 
Geertz and Parsons engaged different aspects of cybernetic research, mobilizing 
information theory for starkly distinct purposes.  Parsonian systems theory was 
centrally committed to understanding the mechanics that undergird social stability 
and coordination.  Parsons wanted to explain how complex societies – marked by 
conflicting groups and interests – functioned as stable wholes, despite the ceaseless 
tugs of social pressures and historical forces.   Geertz, on the other hand, was far more 
interested in exploring the open-ended processes of self-fashioning that characterized 
diverse human lives.   
 
These contrasting models investigate distinct social processes, with the first 
focusing on societal homeostasis (self-regulation and stability) and the later exploring 
self-organisation (learning and adaptation).  The two diverging projects were 
available from the earliest stages of cybernetics research, but as we shall see in the 
next section, the differences between them were political in nature, as well as 
conceptual.  Geertz’s informatic ontology forms part of a complicated conversation 
with his own training in Parsonian social theory, the failures of postwar American 
social science and the stark, new political conflicts of the 1960s, as these emerged 
both in the US and in the postcolonial world.  Geertz unveils his new concept of 
culture, as an information source, during a crucial period in postwar history, in which 
information was being rapidly transformed into a new material artifact of American 
communications engineering, property law and industrial automation.  Geertz 
believed that a renewed theory of culture would help social scientists navigate this 
increasingly uncertain world, as the promises and expansive ambitions of American 
thought, forged in the immediate wake of the second World War, start to fade.  
Reiterating John Platt’s (1965: 4) introduction to the published volume of Monday 
Lectures, Geertz’s culture concept was created to help answer the challenges of ‘a 
transitional crisis’, in which American social scientists moved with ‘halting steps 
through a time of great danger, unsteadily but surely in the direction of a high-
technology world society’. 
 
Parsons and Geertz: Cybernetics, Culture and the Limits of Pax Americana 
 
In a series of autobiographical essays, Geertz describes the heady experience of 
approaching academic social science in the aftermath of World War II (1995: 96-145; 
2000: 3-20; 2010: 185-99). The GI Bill brought a new generation of students to 
campus.  At the same time, senior anthropologists and professional social scientists 
were returning to academic research, after spending the war years immersed in 
planning work and government propaganda efforts.  Having acquired a taste for 
policy-driven research, a range of figures (including Talcott Parsons, Clyde Kluckhohn, 
Margaret Mead, Geoffrey Gorer, Gregory Bateson, Erik Erikson and Cora DuBois) 
began to outline a broader role for the social and behavioral sciences in the postwar 
world, to assist reconstruction and development goals across Europe, Japan and the 
newly independent countries of the colonised world (Price, 2008; Mandler, 2013; 
Heims, 1991: 164-200).  As Geertz (2010: 187) explains, this was an expansive and 
optimistic moment for American anthropology: 
 
What had been an obscure, isolate, even reclusive, lone-wolf sort of 
discipline, concerned mainly with tribal ethnography, racial and 
linguistic classification, cultural evolution, and prehistory, changed in 
the course of a decade into the very model of a modern, policy-
conscious, corporate social science.   
 
After receiving his undergraduate degree from Antioch College, Geertz joined 
the Department of Social Relations at Harvard as a PhD student in 1950.  Social 
Relations, founded under the leadership of Talcott Parsons in 1946, combined training 
in social anthropology, sociology and psychology to create a new, multi-disciplinary 
approach to the modern social sciences.11  Social Relations, in those early decades, 
was founded on the conviction that postwar reconstruction would require a highly 
capacious but fundamentally systematic form of social science.  Geertz’s early work 
was supported through fellowships at Harvard and MIT, where students eagerly 
experimenting with a wide range of methodologies, from ‘group dynamics, learning 
theory, and experimental psychology to structural linguistics, attitude measurement, 
content analysis, and cybernetics’ (2010: 188).12    
 
The last of these approaches, cybernetics, rose to general prominence in 
the1950s and 1960s, and flourished in this same academic and political context that 
led to the creation of Harvard’s department of Social Relations.   Pioneered and 
popularized by MIT-based mathematician, Norbert Wiener, its influence was felt most 
strongly on the east coast of America — in universities, such as Harvard and MIT, as 
well as private institutions, including Cold Springs Harbor, IBM, Bell Labs and the 
Rockefeller Foundation.  With funding from the Josiah Macy Foundation, Norbert 
Wiener and his interlocutors hosted a series of conferences from 1946-1953 to share 
on-going work on servo-mechanical models of the brain and the dynamics of 
homeostatic systems.  After an initial meeting in May of 1946, Paul Lazarsfeld 
organized a second, sub-conference in September — this time more narrowly focused 
on research in the social sciences.  Parsons and Kluckhohn — in the midst of 
organizing and launching Social Relations at Harvard that fall — both attended this 
special session, along with Margaret Mead, Gregory Bateson, the sociologist Robert 
Merton and educator Lawrence K. Frank.13  For Parsons, this second conference 
provided critical access to Wiener’s theories of cybernetic control two years before 
the general publication of Cybernetics.   
 
Parsons was sympathetic to the broad, multi-disciplinary form of inquiry 
initiated by the Macy conferences from the very start.  In the 1930s, he — along with 
Merton and Kluckhohn — had been a keen participant in the intellectual circle that 
centred around Harvard-based biochemist, L. J. Henderson and his physiologist 
colleague, Walter Cannon (who famously coined the term homeostatis to refer to the 
maintenance of steady-states in living organisms).  After this early exposure to 
systems thinking, grounded in the theories of the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto, 
Parsons came to believe that social development and biological development were not 
just analogous – as Durkheimian structuralists assumed – but, were in fact mutually-
dependent, interrelated processes.14  This work also highlighted for Parsons the 
importance of control, or the maintenance of order, since ‘living systems are open 
systems, engaged in continual interchange with their environments’.  The ongoing, 
interactive nature of a system could pose challenges to stability, if it is not well 
regulated.  For Parsons (170: 850), this later problem of control within social systems 
was finally clarified ‘by the emergence, at a most strategic time, of a new development 
in general science—namely, cybernetics and information theory’.  The September 
1946 Macy sub-conference, titled ‘Teleological Mechanisms in Society’, gave Parsons 
new conceptual tools for framing concerns about social order and regulation with 
renewed vigor.  According to Parsons, the ‘cybernetic perspective helped to open new 
possibilities for dealing with the vexing problems of stability and change in action 
systems’.  These new theoretical frameworks helped explain the mechanics of self-
regulation, by which societies remained stable, integrated wholes, while also being 
subject to on-going, dynamic processes of change and development.   According to 
Parsons (1969, 32), high-energy subsystems (such as our metabolic processes) were 
controlled by low-energy, high-information systems (such as neural networks).  
Likewise, culture, as a high-information subsystem, helped to regulate lower 
subsystems, including the impulsive desires of human psychology.  Such hierarchies of 
control were crucial to Parsons’s account of social stability, developmental change and 
purposive human action.   
 
It was at this critical juncture in Parsons’s larger theoretical project that the 
Macy conferences provided an exciting, new language that social scientists could share 
in common with mathematicians, information engineers and physicists.  As historian 
Steve Heims explains in his book, The Cybernetics Group, this framework was political 
as well as conceptual.   For Parsons, the self-regulation of homeostatic systems offered 
an important alternative to ideological control and other violent political forms.  A 
strident anti-totalitarian, Parsons turned to cybernetics as a basis for theorizing non-
coercive models for maintaining social order, in contrast to both Marxism and fascism.  
Clyde Kluckhohn, who attended three of the Macy conferences, likewise believed that 
cybernetics could help frame a democratic response to the challenges of the twentieth 
century.  Kluckhohn expressed hope that an understanding of cybernetic feedback 
would enable policy makers and social scientists to create a lasting peace in the Cold 
War era, by modeling principles of inter-cultural understanding and cooperation:  
 
‘The prime problem of the century is whether world order is to be 
achieved through domination of a single nation that imposes its life 
ways upon all others or through some other means that does not 
deprive the world of the richness of different cultures  . . . The 
anthropologist’s solution is unity in diversity’ (Qtd in Heims, 1991:186).   
 
For both Parsons and Kluckhohn, cybernetic models of complex self-regulating 
systems served as political allegories for an American-led global order, one that 
recognized and managed global cultural differences harmoniously, like an ‘orchestra’ 
(Qtd in Heims, 1991: 186). 
 
Such ‘democratic’ aspirations were coupled with teleological visions of global 
development and international peace and security under the new Pax Americana.  In 
the aftermath of WWII, a more optimistic brand of American social science envisioned 
societies as stable, structured totalities, whose development could be charted and — 
given adequate advances in social theory — possibly even forecast and engineered.  
According to Nils Gilman (2004), underlying these efforts was the faith that Western 
modernity possessed a ‘coherent, unitary, uniform, and worthwhile quality, [which] 
had to be apprehended by a social science that shared these qualities’.  Under the 
tutelage of Parsons and Kluckhohn, Geertz and his colleagues at Harvard and MIT 
attempted to pin down the factors that would either aid or hinder the critical work of 
political and economic development in the newly formed Third World.  Such efforts 
were seen as important, not only for promoting economic growth and social progress, 
but for maintaining a US-led global order, in which large-scale transformation could 
be managed in a manner that minimized global conflict and political instability  
(Gilman, 2004; Heims, 1991). 
 
Trained by Parsons and Kluckhohn, Geertz was shaped by this expansive vision 
of a capacious postwar social science, and many of its central ambitions persist as 
traces within Geertz’s later writings.  Indeed, the success of his culture concept, and its 
reach beyond anthropology, can be partly explained by a lifelong ability to straddle 
disciplinary conversations — a talent honed in the remarkably multi-disciplinary 
environment fostered by the Department of Social Relations.15  At the same time, 
Geertz’s new culture concept explicitly interrogates the core assumptions and political 
claims of postwar American social science.  The 1960s brought new challenges for 
social theory, as the optimism surrounding the economic boom of the previous decade 
began to fade.  Geertz experienced the turbulence of the period from his new post at 
Chicago, where the campus witnessed ‘teach-ins, marches, strikes; the administration 
building was occupied, professors were physically attacked’ (Geertz, 1995: 110).   
Such upheaval was not limited to the US.  During his final fieldtrip to Indonesia in 
1958, Geertz and his then wife Hildred were briefly stranded in West Sumatra while 
an armed rebellion swept through region.   The uprising was brutally crushed by the 
military.   It was a small foreshadowing of the violence that would follow, culminating 
in the CIA-backed massacres of 1965-66, in which more than 500,000 leftist activists 
were killed by the Indonesian military and its supporters. The rise of Suharto brought 
an end to the promises of Bandung, dampening postcolonial aspirations for 
democratically led growth.  Most of Geertz’s work on the culture concept belongs to 
this period, in the interim between his Indonesian fieldwork and his later research in 
Morocco.   
 
Geertz spent the first five years of this turbulent decade chairing the University 
of Chicago’s Committee for the Study of New Nations.  By 1959, nearly 50 newly 
independent countries had joined the world stage.  Initiated by Edward Shils and 
David Apter and funded by the Carnegie Foundation, the Committee set out to 
produce ‘[r]ealistic, sympathetic studies’ of these emerging nations.  In his inaugural 
essay, Shils articulated the aspirations and commitments of the group, arguing that 
good research could dispel the myths and fears that surrounded new nations, and 
could usefully guide their progress and development (Qtd in Geertz, 1995: 112-3).  
However, the following decade saw renewed and heightened conflict across the globe.  
As Geertz (1995: 113) reminds his readers, it was ‘the time of Katanga, the Tonkin 
Gulf, Kashmir, and Biafra’, and Shils’s aspirations for an ‘enlightened’ and 
‘sympathetic’ American foreign policy remained unfulfilled.  In the midst of unsettled 
projects and failing theoretical certainty, Geertz reworked the idea of culture to 
answer a new set of questions, prompted by an altered political horizon.   
 
As part of his work for the Committee on New Nations, Geertz spearheaded the 
1963 publication of an edited volume, Old Societies and New States: The Quest for 
Modernity in Asia and Africa.  In his editorial essay, ‘The Integrative Revolution’, 
Geertz explains that recent events had clearly demonstrated that nations were not the 
stable, culturally integrated wholes once imagined.  An astute political ethnographer, 
Geertz’s writings on Indonesia from this same period strongly emphasize the 
importance of division, tension and conflict in fashioning everyday political and social 
life (Geertz, 1963a; Geertz, 1963c).  Squabbles in the market place, discord between 
traditional political rituals and modern party rhetorics – these were important, if 
potentially unsettling, aspects of developmental processes. While all nations struggled 
to reconcile the politics of group identity with larger civic order, such conflicts were 
even more acute in postcolonial nation-states, or so he claimed.  According to Geertz 
([1963b] 1973: 259), ‘the new states are abnormally susceptible to serious 
disaffection based on primordial attachments’.  His writings expose a strikingly 
paternalistic view of developing nations, calling them ‘naïve’ or (worse still) 
‘[i]imitative, poorly organized, eclectic, opportunistic, subject to fads, ill-defined, 
uncertain’ (Geertz, [1963b] 1973: 278).  Nevertheless, he did not see the political 
turbulence of the ethnic conflict as a sign of dismal failure.  While other Western 
observers had grown pessimistic about the possibility of creating inclusive, 
democratic cohesion in emerging, postcolonial nation-states, Geertz urged caution, 
and argued that the future remained indeterminate.  All social systems, he explained, 
were open and multi-faceted.  It was precisely the negotiation of social diversity (and 
the conflicts that arise around it) that helped constitute an emerging democratic order 
(Geertz, [1963b] 1973: 278-9). 
 
In Old Societies and New States, Geertz and his colleagues meticulously 
catalogue rising political tensions in the Third World.  Demands for the creation of 
linguistic territories in India, attacks on racial minorities in Uganda, the exclusion of 
Tamil-speakers from public service in Sri Lanka, growing hostilities between the Igbo 
and Yoruba communities in Nigeria – each of these signaled the collapse of broader 
democratic harmony.  In its place, observers witnessed sectarian clashes and new, 
more militant, ideological positions.  In turning to these events, Geertz also addressed 
some of the common questions posed by American social scientists during that period.  
Was nationalism inevitably a failed project in postcolonial states?  Was the zealotry of 
ideology to blame?  For Parsons, ideological systems, as condensed expressions of 
cultural values and social self-understandings, were designed to act as cybernetic 
controls that regulated, stabilised and unified societies (Geertz, [1971] 1973: 251).   
The rising factional violence witnessed in Third World politics posed particularly 
acute challenges to Parsonian theories of social unity, stability and regulation. 
 
It is in the context of his work on ‘new nations’ that Geertz actively begins to 
interrogate and modify Parsons’s theory of culture.   He credits Parsons for explaining 
how symbol systems provide important frameworks of understanding and navigating 
a complex social world.  Here again, Geertz argues that culture helps guide human 
activity, much like software provides operational instructions for a computer or a 
recipe instructs a cook: 
 
At once a product and a determinant of social interaction, [symbol 
systems] are to the process of social life as a computer’s program is to 
its operations, the genic helix to the development of the organism, the 
blueprint to the construction of the bridge […] – so the symbol system is 
the information source that, to some extent, gives shape, direction, 
particularity, and point to an ongoing flow of activity (Geertz [1971] 
1973: 250). 
 
While this formulation appears in multiple essays of the time period, Geertz here adds 
an important warning, explaining that culture, as a concrete ‘information source’, does 
not stand apart from its entanglement in the wider social world.  Instead, symbols 
systems are formulated, enacted and refashioned in real time, even as they guide and 
shape human activities.  While analogies with computer programmes and genetic 
codes are useful, they had to be deployed cautiously, since they might incorrectly 
‘suggest a pre-existing template stamping form onto a process external to it’.  This, he 
explains, is one of the central weaknesses of Parsons’s theory of culture.  For Parsons, 
social control mechanisms such as cultural systems necessarily take enduring forms 
that persist over long periods, distinct from the messy, inchoate facts of everyday life.   
 
In contrast to Parsons’s view of culture as a mechanism of social, cybernetic 
regulation, Geertz argues that ideological viewpoints and actual human activity are 
only loosely connected.  Metaphors such as ‘programs’ and ‘codes’ serve as devices for 
reframing Geertz’s central theoretical question: how should contemporary cultural 
theorists ‘conceptualize the dialectic between the crystallization of such directive 
“patterns of meaning” and the concrete course of social life’ ([1971] 1973: 250)?  How 
do our vast, socially dependent understandings translate into lived human 
experiences?  This question, explains Geertz ([1971] 1973: 251), ‘has haunted 
Parsons’s writings on culture from the earliest days’.  Despite Parsons’s claim that 
culture served as a mechanism for social control and regulation, beliefs systems are 
not straightforward determinants of human action.  Rather, they represent incomplete 
attempts to make sense of rapidly changing worlds, even as they give direction and 
form to human activities.  In the ‘new nations’ of the postcolonial world, nationalist 
ideologies did not straightforwardly lead to political violence.  They must be seen as 
incomplete, real-time efforts to grapple with the multi-faceted transformations and 
dislocations of modernisation.  While nationalist fervor had been blamed for much of 
the violence in postcolonial state formation, it had also ‘been a driving force in some of 
the more creative changes in history’ (Geertz [1971] 1973: 254).  For Geertz, a new, 
more flexible, theory of culture – an updated version of Parsons – offered social 
scientists the best theoretical tool for understanding rapidly changing developments 
in Third World politics. 
 
Geertz’s approach to culture was a thorough reconsideration of midcentury 
American social theory – one that, unlike its predecessors, prized models of flexibility, 
incompleteness and discontinuity.  In his1966 essay, ‘Person, Time, and Conduct in 
Bali’, Geertz argues that anthropologists need to take ‘cultural discontinuity’ seriously, 
rather than assuming ‘culture is a seamless web’.  ‘Systems,’ he argues, ‘need not be 
exhaustively interconnected to be systems’ (Geertz, [1966a] 1973: 407).  This 
statement signified a direct challenge to Parsonian theory, in which a social system is 
made up of interpenetrating, neatly layered sub-systems.  For Geertz, discontinuity 
might be a crucial element of social adaptation.  Citing the British cybernetician Ross 
Ashby’s work, Design for a Brain, Geertz explains that ‘there are some rather 
compelling theoretical reasons for believing that a system which is both complex, as 
any culture is, and fully joined cannot function’ (Geertz, [1966a] 1973: 407; emphasis 
added).  Cultural discontinuity, ‘even in highly stable societies’, was an empirical fact 
that social scientists needed to better understand.  What is more, it was likely to be a 
necessary feature of modern societies – a source of their adaptability and 
development.  The appropriate metaphor for culture was not the spider web, but ‘the 
octopus, whose tentacles are in large part separately integrated, neurally quite poorly 
connected with one another and with what in the octopus passes for a brain’ (Geertz 
[1966a] 1973: 408). 
 
The comparison between spider webs and octopuses vividly contrasts two 
distinct agendas within midcentury cybernetic thought.  The first of these, evidenced 
in Parsonian system theory, is an emphasis on self-regulation and homeostasis.  How 
should social scientists model societies as stable but evolving units?  Parsonian theory 
frequently relied upon organismal and structural examples.  As with a spider web, 
societies persist as integrated and identifiable units and gradually expand, while 
necessarily undergoing change, repair and renewal (Parsons, 1970: 850-1).  This is 
Parsons’s account of development — as a slow and ultimately linear process.  For 
Geertz however, writing in the context of the political and social upheavals of the 
1960s, societal transformations had to be theorised differently.  An octopus could lose 
one of its legs, but such trauma is not fatal.  Its cognition is not singularly located but 
distributed across its loosely connected, unwieldy body.16  He argues that culture is 
like an ‘octopoid’.  It does not change ‘all at once in a smoothly coordinated synergy of 
parts, a massive coaction of the whole, but by disjointed movements of this part, then 
that, and now the other which cumulate in directional change’.  Cultures, though 
patterned, are formed by a confluence of ‘partial integration, partial incongruences, 
and partial independencies’ (Geertz [1966a] 1973: 408). 
 
Geertz borrows this language directly from Ashby’s 1960 Design for a Brain.  In 
chapter 13 of that book, Ashby (1960: 171) sets out to describe the behaviour of 
systems that contain ‘partial, fluctuating independencies within the whole’.  In an 
extended footnote, Geertz cites this section of the book to argue that partial social 
connections are crucially responsible for societal adaptation, flexibility and resilience.  
He also quotes the following passage from Design for a Brain:  
 
‘It has been shown so far that, for adaptations to accumulate, there must 
not be channels . . . from some variables . . . to others . . . The idea so 
often implicit in physiological writings that all will be well if only 
sufficient cross-connections are available is . . . quite wrong’ (Qtd in 
Geertz, [1966a] 1973: 407 fn 47).   
 
Ashby’s (1960: v) book focuses on the brain’s ‘unique ability to produce adaptive 
behaviour’.  Given that brains are mechanical devices, with defined physical and 
operational limits, how are they nevertheless capable of learning so many new things 
over the course of a lifetime?  This question would certainly have interested Geertz, 
who had long been fascinated by the plasticity of human brains and who believed that 
this ability was intrinsically linked to the diversity of human symbolic systems.  For 
Ashby, the answer lay in incompletely integrated networks –  in partial connections 
rather than fully, ‘richly’ joined systems and subsystems (Ashby 1960: 205-9).   Partial 
joins are responsible for adaptation and learning, for emergent, expansive growth and 
self-development.   
 
For Geertz, understanding the importance of partially connected, unwieldy 
social formations was centrally important to theorising the unsettling, but still 
indeterminate political development of postcolonial nations, as well as the 
increasingly turbulent political landscape of late Cold War America.  Emphasizing the 
importance of disjuncture, Geertz’s social theory remodeled cultures as discontinuous 
systems rather than seamless, as adaptively transforming rather than stable, and as 
emergent rather than homeostatic. As the optimism of postwar social science started 
to recede, Geertz set out to craft a new approach to culture, one that tried to find 
systematic relationships within social interaction, rather than prior to it.  In an 
interview with Arun Micheelsen conducted in 2000, Geertz claimed that he no longer 
did systems theory, arguing that ‘systematic relationships are to be found in that 
[thing] one is studying, not formulated before the analysis via a general philosophy or 
general theory’ (Micheelsen and Geertz, 2002: 9).  Rather than eschewing cybernetics 
and information theory, Geertz re-appropriates them, using them to reframe 
anthropology’s culture concept with a new emphasis on contingency, complexity and 
the emergent nature of social development.  Reading the ‘Impact of the Concept of 
Culture on the Concept of Man’ in this fashion, we start to see a new direction in 
cybernetic social science, one that emphasizes the indeterminate, processual nature of 
cultural activity, mediated by minute (sometimes discontinuous) acts of symbolic 
interpretation.  Underlying Geertz’s hermeneutics is an informatic ontology, in which 
human development and cultures as mutually constituting.  When the ‘Impact of the 
Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man’ is first published in BAS, it is accompanied 
by a drawing of a man staring up at an open-ended maze.  The future, though path-
dependent, was largely indeterminate, and humans had to write and rewrite the 
instructions for navigating this warren of possibilities, in the moment, through the 
ongoing activity of cultural interpretation. 
 
Epilogue: ‘Tortoises all the way down’  
or Geertz and Cybernetics Beyond the Cold War 
 
In 1948, William Grey Walter, a neuroscientist based at the Burden Institute in 
Bristol, began constructing the first of his famous robot tortoises, Elsie and Elmer.  
Walter referred to them as members of a new inorganic species, which he titled 
Machina speculatrix.  In his 1953 book, The Living Brain, Walter argued that 
imitations of the brain, as a highly complex adaptive machine, could give researchers 
insight into adaptation as a set of behaviors or activities.  An influential member of the 
British cybernetics group, the Ratio Club, Walter was a pioneer in the development of 
electroencephalogram (EEG) devices for recording brain activity and the use of 
electroconvulsive therapy for the treatment of mental illness.  His work on both 
neurons and electrical activity in the brain offered new understandings of the type of 
purposive, goal-seeking behaviour that formed a central concern for many 
cyberneticians of the time.  In The Living Brain, he writes, ‘Goal-seeking missiles were 
literally much in the air in those days; so, in our minds, were scanning mechanisms.’ 
(Langton and Shimohara, 1997: 34-5; emphasis added).  ‘Scanning’ became a term of 
art, indicating the process by which an entity encounters and processes its external 
environment, without relying on sensory or cognitive metaphors that lean too heavily 
on notions of ‘seeing’ or ‘understanding.’ 
 
Walter’s tortoises were equipped with one front wheel and two back wheels.  
They were programmed to follow a few simple directives.  Operated by a battery-
powered motor, the tortoises were light seeking, but only up to a certain intensity of 
illumination.  With the help of a photocell in front, they would locate and move 
towards light sources, but if the light were too bright, they would reverse direction.  If 
they hit an obstacle, they would move back and forth until they managed to extricate 
themselves.  This simple experiment yielded some surprising observations.  While the 
robot tortoises were very primitive examples of ‘artificial life’, their behaviour proved 
to be unpredictable and ‘lively’ (Walter, 1953: 126).17  Each was equipped with a 
small running light, so when a tortoise encountered a mirror or another tortoise, the 
observer might see a complex dance, watching the machines move towards, away 
from and around their own lights.  The tortoises, prominently featured in a 1950 
Scientific American article (Walter, 1950: 42-45), demonstrated the complex activity 
of ‘scanning’ through which such living or lively entities encountered and navigated 
the world around them.    
 
According to Andrew Pickering, cybernetic models of servomechanical 
structures were less concerned with representation than with performance.  Despite 
the simplicity of their construction, Elsie and Elmer were unpredictable.  They activity 
could not be forecast ahead of time, since each iteration might produce sharply 
varying, unforeseen outcomes.  Quoting from Walter’s own writing on the subject, 
Pickering explains, ‘[I]t is often quite impossible to decide whether what the model is 
doing is the result of its design or its experience’ (2010: 50). The tortoises do not 
possess a high-level ‘understanding’ of the world around them, but nevertheless 
behaved in purposive and complex ways, ‘scanning’ their surroundings, seeking out 
certain conditions while shying away from others.  Cybernetic researchers such as 
Walter were concerned with how things behaved in the world, not with how such 
entities understand or represent their surroundings.  The tortoise robots and their 
wanderings modeled the brain (a much more complex entity) not because the 
machines ‘knew’ about lights or obstacles, but because their goal-seeking behaviour 
had emergent, non-deterministic properties.  According to Pickering, Walter’s 
tortoises stage a cybernetic ontology — one more interested in the contingent and 
emergent activity of living beings than the deterministic causal relations that are 
mapped by modern science.     
Seen in this context, we can read Geertz’s early account of culture against 
convention, not solely as a set of concerns about regimes of representation, but as a 
new way of framing the open-ended and mutually-constitutive fashioning of humans 
and their culture – the purposive, self-generative activity of meaning-making.  In the 
‘Impact of the Concept of Culture’, the focus remained squarely on the ‘interpretation’ 
of symbolic structures as an action in itself.  Such interpretive acts could decipher so 
many winks and twitches and blinks, and turn the endless (and endlessly variable) 
artifacts of human culture into legible and operable programming, which in turn made 
human choices and life both meaningful and possible.18  This is not to argue that 
Geertz was uninterested in human understanding or in problems of epistemology 
(since these were certainly at the center of his humanistic interests), but only to bring 
attention to the fact that ‘meaning-making’, as an activity, sits at the centre of on-going 
cultural performances.  If Walter’s turtles behaved in surprisingly complex ways, 
despite the simplicity of their programming, by analogy, we begin to  imagine how 
much more complex and diverse human activity must be, if humans also have the 
capacity to produce and alter their own instructions, rules and codes. 
 
This insight — that Geertz’s account of man’s search for meaning also 
emphasizes the action and mechanics of interpretation — leads to some surprising 
conclusions.  First, despite the emphasis on culture as an epistemological project, 
Geertz’s notion of culture required a discrete, informatic ontology of what it means to 
be human.  If the recent ontological turn in anthropology is an attempt to reconsider 
the relationship of the human and natural worlds, it is worth bearing in mind that 
ontology did not disappear from late twentieth century cultural theory.  When Geertz 
writes, (based on an allegedly Hindu tale) that it’s ‘turtles all the way down’, this was 
not (as frequently presented) a way of saying that there are no ontological 
foundations to knowledge.  Instead, meaning and form are co-constituted in this 
model.  Philip Descola, in his article ‘Modes of being and forms of predication’, defends 
a conceptual distinction between ethnography and anthropology.  It is not the task of 
anthropology, he argues, to ‘provide “thick descriptions” of specific institutions, 
cultural habits, or social practices – this is the job of ethnography’.  Anthropology, in 
contrast, must shed light on ‘how beings of a certain kind — humans — operate in 
their environment, how they detect in it such or such property that they make use of, 
and how they manage to transform this environment by weaving with it and between 
themselves permanent or occasional relations of a remarkable, but not infinite, 
diversity’ (Descola, 2014: 273).  Hence, anthropology is concerned with ontological 
relationships, while ethnography only describes (albeit thickly) particular social 
phenomena.  Yet, putting the claims of the ontological anthropology alongside Geertz’s 
mid-century account of man and his culture, there are startling similarities between 
the two.  Geertz’s informatic account of humans fashioning their own cultural 
programs is also of a story of ontological becoming, in which the boundless 
uncertainties of life are encountered and navigated, and where deciphering the lively, 
confusing tensions of cockfights and political rallies has the power to produce diverse 
social and material outcomes. 
 
 Ultimately, the purpose of this essay is neither to resuscitate Geertzian 
anthropology, nor to defend Geertz himself from his critics.  Rather, it is an attempt to 
revisit midcentury intellectual developments, in order to lend a new, critical 
framework for evaluating current trends and claims within anthropological theory, 
much of which are based on loose but important historical claims about rupture and 
discontinuity.  In writing this, I echo recent work by John Johnston on cybernetics and 
machinic life.  Johnston explains that ‘contrary to widespread belief, cybernetics was 
not simply a short-lived, neomechanistic attempt to explain all purposeful behavior – 
whether that of humans, animals, or machines – as the sending and receiving of 
messages in a feedback loop’.  Rather it represents ‘the historical nexus out of which 
the information networks and computational assemblages that constitute the 
infrastructure of the postindustrial world first developed, spawning new technologies 
and intellectual disciplines we now take for granted’ (Johnston, 2009: 26).  As such, 
returning to Geertz’s midcentury entanglements offers new, more precise genealogies 
for better articulating our current questions about the nature of information 
economies and our debates over the posthuman.  In the process, some of the 
questions raised by the cultural turn recede, while others deserve greater and perhaps 
renewed consideration.  For instance, it becomes easier to see that culture is both 
something humans do and who they are.  In retrospect, it is not very surprising that an 
open-ended, recursive and emergent model of self-fashioning would have been an 
object of vexation for anti-essentialist critics in the 1980s and 1990s.  However, 
scholarly concerns about power, and the claim that Geertzian views of culture does 
not adequately take into account the significant and damaging distortions of power 
imbalances, might be restaged and rearticulated for a new moment, to sharply 
examine the ontological turn’s ability to contend with human experiences of 
exploitation, precarity and injustice.  Both Geertz and Descola are interested in 
explaining the constitutive diversity of human cultural practices, and not necessarily 
with asking the question, ‘Whose ‘being-in-the-world’ comes to matter?’  By tracing 
the informatic ontology underlying Geertz’s interpretivism, we provide a new entry 
point for critically interrogating our own conceptual moment, and for thinking about 
the historical precursors, conceptual possibilities and political limits of anthropology’s 
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* Note on style: I have included the original publication dates, in brackets, for all of the essays which appear 
in the Interpretation of Cultures, so that readers can easily follow the historical thread of ideas from this 
period in Geertz’s writing.  However, I have opted to cite from Interpretation of Cultures, rather than from 
earlier publications, since references in that text are much easier for contemporary readers to chase up. 
1 The different sciences listed above (‘cybernetics, information theory, neurology, molecular genetics’) are 
historically closely related.  Cybernetics, the study of communication and self-regulation in systemic 
processes, used the emerging sciences of information analysis and engineering to study a host of complex 
biological processes including neural signaling and genetic coding.  See Gleick, 2011; Kay, 2000; and 
Wiener, 1948.  
2 While Geertz implies that Levi-Strauss’s grasp of cybernetics was shallow at best, new historical research by 
Bernard Geoghegan persuasively argues just the opposite.  See Geoghegan, 2011. 
3 This period saw the demise of many experimental, multi-disciplinary institutes and faculties where 
cybernetics and systems theory had been incubated after the war, including Talcott Parsons’s Department of 
Social Relations at Harvard and Heinz von Foerster’s Biological Computer Lab at the University of Illinois 
Urbana-Champagne 
4 Geertz (1973: viii) explains in the volume’s preface that the essays were republished for ‘retrospective 
exhibition.’  Since ‘correcting one’s misjudgments by writing changed views back into earlier works’ would 
not be ‘wholly cricket,’ he decided to keep revisions to a minimum.  ‘The Impact of the Concept of Culture on 
the Concept of Man’ was first published in 1965, and true to his word, Geertz made very few changes to the 
text between 1965 and 1973.  Between the two publications (Platt, 1965; Geertz, 1973), he took out one 
comma and changed Homo australopithecus to read simply (and accurately) Australopithecus. 
                                                                                                                                                     
5 The term culture became a very popular way of addressing race-based differences in the 1980s and 1990s, 
without explicitly engaging the politics of race.  See for instance Huntington and Harrison (2001) claim that 
racialized urban violence and disparity in the US finds its roots in a ‘culture of poverty’.  In a similar vein, 
celebrations of multiculturalism from this period frequently elided issues of historical injustice and on-going 
racial inequality. Elizabeth Povinelli’s (2002) work exposes many of these dynamics.  See her analysis of 
Australian political discourse, which encourages citizens, after decades of racial injustice, to start enjoying 
their differences, which (after all) are merely cultural, and as such, define the boundaries of a tolerant, 
multicultural society.  
6 See the editors’ note for the 40th anniversary issue (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1985, 4(7)). 
7 See for instance Alvin W Gouldner (1970), for an account of how this growing unrest challenged 
foundational theories and methods within the field of American sociology. 
8 Besides Geertz, other speakers included the Nobel Prize winners Willard Libby, Roger Sperry and George 
Wald, along with information scientist and historian of science, Derek John de Solla Price and James 
Redfield, from the Committee on Social Thought.  The series organizer John Platt and the biologist Roger 
Sperry had both been active in the field of cybernetics prior to these lectures.  In June 1960, Sperry and Platt 
presented papers at Heinz von Foerster’s Symposium on Self-Organization hosted by his Biological Computer 
Laboratory on the campus of the University of Illinois Urban-Champagne.  Funded by the Information 
Systems Branch of the U. S. Navy, the conference also included contributions from Gordon Bask, Stafford 
Beer, Ross Ashby, Warren McCulloch and Friedrich Hayek.  See Heinz von Foerster and George W. Zopf 
(1962). 
9 This insight (along with many others), I owe to Anush Kapadia, who analyzed these citations in an earlier 
draft of this paper. 
10 There’s some dispute over whether Wiener or Shannon first developed this mathematical approach to 
analysing information transmission in relation to entropy.  For an overview, see Kline, 2015. 
11 In their joint 1941 memorandum, ‘Towards a Common Language for the Areas of the Social Sciences,’ 
Parsons, Clyde Kluckhohn and O. H. Taylor present their pedagogical approach as a grand synthesis of the 
theories of Pareto, Weber, Durkheim, Freud, Marshall and Malinowski.  Parsons had attempted an earlier 
version of this theoretical convergence in his 1937 book The Structure of Social Action.  In that work, he’d 
dealt primarily with the work of Marshall, Pareto, Weber and Durkheim.  In the intervening period, as Parsons 
came to read and depend more on Freud and on psychoanalysis generally, the project grew in both scope and 
ambition (Parsons, 1937; Parsons 1970: 826-881). 
12 The emergence of the US as a global superpower after the war, the booming post-war economy, and 
increased faith in technology and technical expertise underwrote renewed interest in scientific 
experimentation across the social sciences (Heims, 1991: 1-6). 
13 For a more thorough account of the Department of Social Relations and its early history, see Isaac, 2012: 
158-190. 
14 For references to the influence of the group around L. J. Henderson, see Parsons [1951] 1991: x; and Turner 
1991: xvii. 
15 Geertz spent most of his career in interdisciplinary think tanks, projects and institutes (Harvard’s 
Laboratory for Social Relations, Stanford’s Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, the 
Chicago Committee for the Study of New Nations and the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton), rather 
than traditional academic anthropology departments.  Over the course of a career that spanned 50 years, 
Geertz spent just one year teaching in Berkeley’s anthropology department (1958-1959) and 10 years in 
                                                                                                                                                     
anthropology at the University of Chicago.  The first five years of his appointment at Chicago were funded by 
the University’s Committee for the Comparative Study of New Nations and the later 5 years by a Senior 
Career Research Fellowship from the National Institutes of Mental Health (Geertz, 1995: 114). 
16 See for instance https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/octopus-chronicles/even-severed-octopus-arms-have-
smart-moves/ 
17 Walter explained that ‘the variation of behaviour patterns exhibited even with such economy of structure 
are complex and unpredictable’ (1953: 126).  See Pickering, The Cybernetic Brain (2010: 50) for an extended 
analysis of this view of ‘lively’ behaviour. 
18 In an early, unpublished book chapterisation, Geertz originally titled the second chapter of his culture book, 
‘Culture as an Action System.’  When an anonymous reader questioned this title, and argued that action 
system theory (as a Parsonian framing) included personality, society and culture, Geertz seems to have 
dropped that phrase entirely.  ‘The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man’, which appears 
as the second essay in the final volume when published in 1973, does not use the term ‘action system’, but 
that initial framing importantly highlights the role that interpretation plays in human activity (not just in 
human understanding) by generating actionable instructions, codes and programs.  See Geertz, n.d.a  
